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ABSTRACT 
The Impact of Training on Productivity and Wages: Firm Level 
Evidence 
This paper uses firm level panel data of firm provided training to estimate its 
impact on productivity and wages. To this end the strategy proposed by 
Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) for estimating production functions to 
control for the endogeneity of input factors and training is applied. The 
productivity premium for a trained worker is estimated at 23%, while the wage 
premium of training is estimated at 12%. Our results give support to recent 
theories that explain work related training by imperfect competition in the labor 
market. 
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1 Introduction
In recent years trade unions, employers and policy makers have emphasized the
importance of skill upgrading of workers and life long learning in order to cope
with increased pressures induced by technological change and globalization (e.g;
European Commission, 2007). While there exists a large literature showing that
the accumulation of human capital through the general education system plays
a crucial role in explaining long run income di¤erences between rich and poor
countries, much less work exists on the e¤ects of training provided by rms,
often requiring specic skills from their workers.
In his seminal work, Becker(1964) made a distinction between rm specic
and general training. General training results in skills that are equally applica-
ble at other rms while skills acquired through rm specic training are lost
when the trained worker leaves the rm that provided training. Under perfect
competition in the labor market, workers should pay for costs of general train-
ing and recoup these costs by earning higher wagers. When training is specic,
rms pay (part of) the training costs1 . However, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a,
1999b) point out that in numberous cases rms provide and pay for training
that is general in nature. They show how this can be explained by labor market
imperfections. In particular, a necessary condition for rms to pay for general
training is that wages increase less steeply in training than productivity. This
is referred to as a compressed wage structure which can be caused by frictions
in the labor market such as search costs, informational asymmetries, e¢ ciency
wages and labor market institutions such as unions or the presence of minimum
wage laws. With a compressed wage structure, training increases the marginal
product of labor more than wages, which creates incentives for the rm to invest
in training.
While there exists substantial evidence that general education increases
wages2 and productivity of workers, there is hardly any work that studies the
impact of work related training on rm level productivity and wages. Moretti
1 In fact, with rm specic training it is more e¢ cient if rms and workers share the costs
and benets of training. Wages of workers increase after specic training above the level they
could earn elsewhere but lower than their marginal product which reduces both the probability
they quit the rm and the propability they are laid o¤.
2Card (1999), for instance, summarizes various studies and concludes that the impact of
a year of schooling on wages is about 10%.
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(2004) focuses on plant level productivity gains from education, but he has no
data on rm provided training. He nds that plants operating in cities that
experience a large increase in the share of college graduates have higher pro-
ductivity gains than in cities that have a lower increase in college graduates,
but these productivity gains are o¤set by wage increases. Bartel (1995) studies
how rm provided training a¤ects wage proles of workers and job performance
scores in one large rm and nds that training has a positive e¤ect. Dearden,
Reed and Van Reenen (2006) analyze the link between training, wages and pro-
ductivity at the sector level using a panel of British industries. They nd that
raising the proportion of workers in an industry who receive training by one
percentage point increases value added per worker in the industry by 0.6% and
average wages by 0.3%.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we make use
of rm level data about training. Belgian rms are obliged by law to submit
a supplement to the annual report which contains information on various ele-
ments of training, such as the proportion of workers that received training, the
number of hours they were trained and the cost of training to the rm. This
data allows us to measure the impact of training on both wages and produc-
tivity at the rm level and we can infer whether trained workers are paid the
value of their marginal product. By focusing on rm level data we are able
to avoid possible aggregation biases and hence capture the e¤ects of training
more precisely. Second, the analysis at the rm level allows us to control for
the endogeneity of training. To this end we use the estimation strategy recently
introduced by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) for estimating production
functions which allows us to control for the endogeneity of input factors. Third,
we are able to explore various dimensions of the data set. Because of the large
number of observations, we can analyze di¤erences between narrowly dened
sectors with respect to the impact of training on rm performance and we are
able to measure di¤erential impacts on wages and productivity for male versus
female workers.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. Training has a positive im-
pact on productivity and wages. The marginal product of a trained worker is on
average 23% higher than that of an untrained worker while wages only increase
with 12% in response to training. This nding is consistent with recent theories
that explain rm provided training by models with imperfect competition in the
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labor market and is robust against di¤erent kinds of specications and estima-
tion strategies. Among the di¤erent manufacturing sectors, largest productivity
gains can be found in the Chemicals and Rubber & Plastic industries. Finally
we nd that there is no di¤erential impact of training on the productivity of
male versus female workers, but wages increase more in response to training for
female workers than for male workers.
The next section gives the empirical framework we use and we describe our
estimation strategy in Section 3. We give an overview of the dataset in Section
4. Results are reported in Section 5 and we conclude in Section 6.
2 Empirical Framework
We infer the impact of training on both wages and productivity by applying
a framework used by Hellerstein et al. (1999). The idea is to simultaneously
estimate a wage equation and a production function to compare gains in wages
with the gains in productivity that may arise in response to training. In com-
petitive labor markets, returns from human capital formation accrue to workers
in the form of wages and the productivity premium of a trained worker equals
its wage premium3 .
2.1 Impact of training on productivity
The output of a rm i in period t is a function of capital and a quality labor
aggregate used by the rm in period t. As is common in the literature, we
assume that this function takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
Yit = AitbLlitKkit (1)
with Yit value added, bLit the quality of labor aggregate and Kit is capital of rm
i in period t. Ait represents Hicks neutral technical e¢ ciency of the rm. Taking
3The framework has been applied among others by Jones (2001) to examine the impact of
education on earnings and productivity and by Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) to estimate
whether the wage gap between men and women can be explained by productivity di¤erentials.
Frazer (2001) uses the methodology to nd unbiased estimates for the impact of education on
wages. More recently Van Biesebroeck (2007) applies the framework to estimate returns to
human capital on both productivity and wages for some African countries and Dearden et al.
(2006) estimate the impact of training on wages and productivity for a panel of UK industries.
4
natural logarithmes of all variables, the logarithm of output can be written as
linear function of the logarithm of inputs4 :
yit = 0 + l
blit + kkit + it (2)
where l is the labor aggregate, k is capital and y is value added of rm i in
period t. The productivity term ait can be decomposed in a xed component
0 which is common to all rms and a component it which represents rm and
time specic deviations from the average productivity level.
So far, the assumption of the homogeneity of labor has been maintained.
Now we relax this assumption and take into account the amount of training
that is provided by each rm to its employees. There are several ways to bring
training into the model. First, we dene training as a discrete characteristic,
namely we divide the labor force into trained and untrained workers. Second,
we take into account the intensity of training and use training costs as a variable
to reect di¤erences between employees.
If we model training as a discrete characteristic, the labor aggregate bL can
be written as the sum of the number of each type of worker multiplied with
its marginal productivity level relative to that of an untrained worker5 . The
relative (marginal) productivity di¤erential of a trained worker compared to an
untrained worker, T , is dened as T  @Y=@LT @Y=@LU@Y=@LU  MPT MPUMPU where
LU and LT represent respectively the number of untrained and trained workers.
We can then write the labor aggregate bL as
bL = LU + (1 + T )LT (3)
This functional form assumes that trained and untrained workers are perfect
substitutes and a rm makes its training decisions solely based on productivity
di¤erences between employees and the cost of training. We can rewrite bL as:
bL = L(1 + T LTL ) (4)
Here L represents the total number of employees and is by denition the sum of
both trained and untrained workers. Consequently, LTL is the fraction of trained
workers in the labor force. Substituting Equation (4) in Equation (2) gives:
4Throughout the rest of the paper, lower case letters represent variables expressed in
logarithms.
5Firm and time subscripts are omitted for the rest of this section. When we turn to the
estimation strategy in the next section, we will reintroduce the subscripts.
5
y = 0 + ll + l ln

1 + T
LT
L

+ kk +  (5)
or when T
LT
L is small, this can be approximated by
y = 0 + ll + lT
LT
L
+ kk +  (6)
In principle we can infer the training premium from a linear regression of out-
put on capital, labor and the share of trained workers in total employment. For
example if we estimate T to be :20, this implies that the marginal product
of a trained worker is 20% higher than that of an untrained worker6 . How-
ever both inputs and the number of trained workers are likely to be correlated
with elements of the unobserved productivity  of a rm which complicates the
identication of the coe¢ cients. We turn back to this issue in Section 3. In
Appendix A we generalize the approach to include multiple characteristics of
the workforce.
So far we have dened training as a discrete characteristic. Either a worker
has received training over the period or he has not. However, this is a simpli-
cation since there exists considerable variation in the amount of training each
worker received. For example, the rm specic average investment in training
per worker trained ranges from less than 100 e to more than 10,000 e. To
take into account these variations in training intensity across trained workers,
we include training as a continuous variable instead of a binary variable. Frazer
(2001) shows how to derive the labor aggregate in a production function con-
sistent with Mincer (1974) when the characteristic that di¤erentiates the labor
force is a continuous variable7 . In our baseline model, workers di¤er only by
the amount of training they received. A typical equation in the style of Mincer
(1974) that explains the earnings of individual j as a function of the amount of
training he obtained, looks like:
ln(Wj) = 0 + TTj + j (7)
6Note that to measure the impact of training on output, T has to be multiplied by the
labor coe¢ cient: @ lnY
@LT
= T l.
7To be precise, Frazer (2001) derives this result under the assumption of perfect compe-
tition in the labor market. Intuitively, if a rm is prot maximizing and acts as a price taker
in the labor market, di¤erences in wages should reect di¤erences in marginal products and
the aggregate labor term in the production function should have exactly the same functional
form as the wage equation. However, with for example labor market frictions, productivity
premia do not necessarily equal wage premia and we have to assume that the functional form
of the labor aggregate in the production function is the same as the functional form of the
wage equation.
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which means that the average wage bill of a rm can be written as
P
j exp(0+
TTj + j). Here Tj represents the amount of training worker j has received.
Frazer (2001) proves that if the rm is maximizing its prots, the labor term
in the production function should have the same form as the wage bill, i.e.bL =Pj exp(1 + TTj) and the production function can be written as follows:
Y = A(
X
j
exp(1 + TTj))
lKk (8)
where T measures how the contribution of an individual worker j to the aggre-
gate labor term varies with the amount of training he received (@ ln(bL)=@Tj =
T ). Taking natural logrithmes, this can be rewritten as:
y = l1 + l ln(
X
j
exp(TTj)) + kk + a (9)
A rst-order Taylor approximation of the labor term results in a loglinear equa-
tion that can be estimated (cf. Frazer, 2001). The logarithm of output is a
function of the logarithm of the number of workers and capital and the average
training intensity of all workers in a particular rm:
y = 0 + ll + lTT + kk +  (10)
The coe¢ cient on average training intensity T measures how the labor ag-
gregate changes with training intensity. The impact of training on output
depends also on the importance of labor in the production function l, i.e.
@y=@T = lT , which represents the percentage changes in output in response
to variations in average training intensity of the workforce.
2.2 Impact of training on wages
We derive wage equations similar to Equations (6) and (10). The wage equation
will be more descriptive than the structural productivity equation. Again, we
rst build up the empirical framework dening training to be a discrete char-
acteristic. Second, we take into account the variations in training intensity in
terms of training costs accross trained employees.
To measure wage di¤erentials between trained and untrained employees, we
apply rm-level wage equations as in Hellerstein et al. (1999). We dene a wage
equation in the style of Mincer (1974) for individual j:
Wj =WUDj;U +WTDj;T
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where Wj is the wage of individual j. WU and WT are the average wages of
an untrained and trained employee respectively and Dj;U and Dj;T represent
a dummy eaqual to one if the employee received no training or training. By
summing over all employees at a rm, the total wage bill of a rm equals the sum
of the wages of trained and untrained employees multiplied by respectively the
number of trained and untrained employees active in the rm. This expression
can be rewritten as
WL =WULU +WTLT =WUL+ TWULT =WUL(1 + T
LT
L
) (11)
where T = WT WUWU represents the relative wage premium for a trained em-
ployee compared to an untrained one. Dividing both sides by the number of
employees and taking logs of Equation (11) one obtains
w = wU + ln

1 + T
LT
L

 wU + T LT
L
(12)
Where the last step follows from the fact that ln(1+x) can be approximated by x
if x is small. This equation at the rm level is consistent with the individual level
Mincer (1974) wage equations. Under perfect competition on the labor market,
wages do not vary systematically across rms and regressing the average wage on
a constant and the share of trained employees will give a consistent estimate for
the relative wage premium of trained employees. However, we will include the
capital intensity and total factor productivity in the estimation equation in order
to allow for imperfectly competitive labor markets and unobserved di¤erences
in labor quality which should be reected in total factor productivity. Adding
a vector of control variables X and an additive error term8 to equation (12) we
get:
w = wU + T
LT
L
+X + " (13)
which can be estimated by applying a least squares estimator9 .
The derivation of a rm level wage equation when we take into account
variations in training intensity accross trained workers is similar to the derivation
8Note that Equation (12) is not a behavioral equation, but simply denes the average
wage to be a function of the wages of each di¤erent type of worker. The error term that we
add can represent measurement error, variation across rms in wages across rms unrelated
to productivity di¤erences, regional di¤erences in labor market conditions, . . .
9Again, we refer to Appendix A for the inclusion of multiple workforce characteristics in
the wage equation.
8
of the labor aggregate in the production function of the previous section. The
average wage in a rm can be written as:
w = wU + TT (14)
Where T represents average training costs per employee, T measures how wage
premiums change with the intensity of training (@w=@T ) and wU is the average
wage of a worker that received no training at all. Again we add an additive
error term and control variables:
w = wU + TT +X + " (15)
which can be estimated using ordinary least squares.
3 Estimation strategy
One needs to be careful in estimating the production function in Equation (2)
since inputs are likely to be correlated with the unobserved productivity term.
In this section, we describe in detail how we solve this problem. Recall the
production function derived in the previous section:
yit = 0 + llit + lT
LT;it
Lit
+ kkit + !it + it (16)
where the unobserved productivity term it is divided into two components,
namely !it and it. Unobservables that are not seen by the rm at the moment
when it makes its input decisions are represented by the mean zero error term
it. Consequently, inputs will be uncorrelated with this unobservable. An exam-
ple is an unexpected machine breakdown or strike. Also measurement error in
the output variable can be incorporated in it: The !it represents productivity
unobserved by the econometrician, but observed by the rm before making its
input decisions. Examples include managerial ability, expected machine break-
downs, technological progress, worker ability,. . . As such the input choices are
likely to be correlated with the unobserved error term !it and estimating Equa-
tion (16) with OLS will generate biased coe¢ cient estimates. This simultaneity
bias has been documented rst by Marschak and Andrews (1944)10 . Note that
also the unobserved (by the econometrician) ability of employees or labor qual-
ity is likely to be included in the productivity term !it. If rms tend to provide
10For an overview of the outstanding issues in estimating production functions, we refer to
Ackerberg et al. (2005).
9
training to the most able employees, for example because they are faster learners
and therefore require a smaller training investment, the estimated coe¢ cient on
the training variable will be upward biased.
Olley and Pakes (1996) o¤er a solution to the endogeneity problem. They
set up a dynamic model and derive the productivity !it to be a function of in-
vestment and capital. As such, productivity can be proxied by a nonparametric
function of investment and capital and can be controlled for in the estimation
of Equation (16). The drawback of this method is that only observations with
positive investment levels can be used in the estimation. Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) overcome this problem by using material inputs instead of investment
in the estimation of productivity !it. Both methods assume that labor has no
dynamic implications and hence the choice of labor in year t has no impact on
future prots. This implies among others that there can be no hiring and ring
costs and that rms can choose each period the optimal amount of labor at a
given wage rate without any limitations. Given that Belgium is a highly union-
ized country with a rigid labor market and that there exist considerable costs in
laying o¤ employees, we will relax this assumption. Moreover, Ackerberg, Caves
and Frazer (2006) note that identifying the coe¢ cients on labor and materials
using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) or Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology
could be problematic due to collinearity issues. For these reasons, we will follow
the methodology proposed by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) to correct for
the simultaneity bias, which we will discuss now in more detail.
We keep the timing assumption made in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and
Olley and Pakes (1996) about the capital accumulation function:
kit = (1  )kit 1 + iit 1 (17)
with iit 1 investment decided in period t  1. Intuitively, the expression means
that it takes a full period to order and install the new capital goods before
they enter the production process. We will use this assumption to identify
the capital coe¢ cient in the second stage of the estimaton strategy since by
denition the capital stock will be uncorrelated with the part of productivity
in year t, unforeseen in year t   1. Furthermore we assume that !it follows a
rst-order Markov process:
p (!itjIit 1) = p (!itj!it 1) (18)
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where Iit is the information set of rm i at period t   1. This assumption
means that rmsexpectations of future productivity only depend on current
productivity. We assume material input to be chosen after labor input and
training which seems plausible for an economy with rigid labor markets like
Belgium. As a result, material demand will not only be a function of capital and
productivity (as in Levinsohn and Petrin 2003), but also of labor and training:
mit = ft

!it; lit;
LT;it
Lit
; kit

(19)
When this material demand function is strictly increasing in productiv-
ity !it, it can be inverted to obtain an expression for productivity !it =
f 1t

mit; lit;
LT;it
Lit
; kit

. Note that we have to assume that productivity is the
only unobservable in the material demand function. This means that input
prices are constant across rms11 and there are no other unobservables a¤ecting
material demand but not production. An important advantage of this proce-
dure is that the setting allows labor and training to have dynamic implications
such that the optimal choice of training, lit and kit depend on previous labor,
training and capital input decisions12 . Obviously, the optimal choice of material
input does not depend on previous choices of capital, labor and training. Mate-
rial input in period t has only an impact on prots in period t and thus depends
only on the other inputs in year t. Substituting inverse material demand in the
production function gives the rst stage equation13 :
yit = llit + tr
LT;it
Lit
+ kkit + f
 1
t

mit; lit;
LT;it
Lit
; kit

+ it (20)
We will use a series estimator with a polynomial in materials, labor, capital
and training to proxy the inverse demand function f 1(:). Clearly l, k, and
tr will not be identied here since these inputs are also included in the inverse
material demand function. This is in contrast with Olley and Pakes (1996) and
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) who identify the labor coe¢ cient in the rst stage
11We include year dummies to control for input prices changing over time.
12As noted by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006), another advantage of this procedure is
that it is consistent with other unobservables a¤ecting rms choices of lit; kit and LiT . This
is because mit depends directly on lit; kit and LiT . These unobservables, such as dynamic ad-
justment costs, both linear as non-linear, are allowed to be correlated over time since material
inputs are only relevant for current output. However, there cannot exist unobservables that
directly a¤ect material demand since they would make the inversion of the material demand
function invalid.
13tr is dened as tr  lT
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of the estimation strategy14 . Here, the rst stage only serves to seperate it
from !it. Estimating the above equation gives a measure bit for the following
term:
it = llit + tr
LT;it
Lit
+ kkit + !it (21)
which is in fact output net of the error term it. The estimate bit will be used to
identify the input coe¢ cients in the second stage. Productivity !it is assumed
to follow a rst-order Markov process and can be written as follows:
!it = E [!itjIit 1] + it (22)
= E [!itj!it 1] + it
= g(!it 1) + it
where it represents the innovation in productivity, namely the part of produc-
tivity in period t that was unforeseen by the rm in period t   1. Given the
timing assumption that the capital stock in period t was decided in period t 1,
this leads to a rst moment condition which will allow us to identify the capital
coe¢ cient:
E [itjkit] = 0 (23)
Moreover, we assume that labor input and the amount of training do not
depend on the innovation in productivity. For the labor coe¢ cient, this is a
more strict assumption than usually applied. However, in the Belgian context
there are substantial labor adjustment costs such that labor is not freely variable
input15 . Concerning the training variable, several human resources managers
conrmed that the amount of training provided to workers is mostly decided
one year in advance when making up the budget for the following year, which
makes the amount of training independent from the innovation in productivity,
it. Consequently, the moment conditions to identify the labor and training
coe¢ cients in the second stage are:
14Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) argue there are serious identication issues with
these methodologies due to collinearity between labor and the input demand function.
15For example, the OECD Employment Protection Legislation for Belgium is among the
highest among the industrialized countries (higher scores indicate stricter regulation). Belgium
has especially a high score for the notice and severence pay for individual dismissals, legislation
concerning collective dismissals and temporary employment (OECD 2007).
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E24itj kitlit
LT;it=Lit
35 = 0 (24)
In practice, we apply the rst stage by non-parametrically regressing yit
on the production inputs. This gives us an estimate bit for it = llit +
tr
LT;it
Lit
+kkit+!it. Given a candidate value for the vector of input coe¢ cients
(l; k; tr), we can compute b!it as follows:
b!it = bit   llit   trLT;itLit   kkit (25)
Next, we non-parametrically regress !it on !it 1. The residuals from this re-
gression bit represent innovations in productivity, which are by assumption un-
correlated with training, labor and capital. This renders the above moment
conditions and their sample analogue:
1
T
1
N
X
t
X
t
bit
0@ kitlit
LT;it=Lit
1A (26)
and we compute the sample analogue for each (l; k; tr) For each new candi-
date value of (l; k; tr), we obtain new estimates for it and we repeat this
procedure until Equation (26) is minimized.
Given the input coe¢ cients we found in the previous step, we nd an es-
timate for total factor productivity by applying Equation (25). We use this
estimate in the wage equation as control variable to pick up unobservables such
as worker ability that inuence wages of the workers. When not controlled for,
these variables could cause our estimate for the wage premium to be biased16 .
Standard errors for all coe¢ cients are obtained by using a bootstrap procedure
with 500 replications. We apply a block bootstrap procedure such that the error
term is allowed to be heteroskedastic and correlated over time t, for a given rm
i but is assumed to be independent over i.
16This is a similar strategy as applied in Frazer (2001).
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4 Data Description
Data is obtained from the Belrst database. This database commercialized by
Bureau Van Dijck includes information about all Belgian rms that need to le
an annual report17 and is used by a number of other recent economic studies
for example De Loecker (2006) and Abraham et al. (2009). Data are taken
for the period 1997-2006 for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing rms.
We select a number of key variables needed for the estimation of production
functions such as value added, number of employees, material costs and the
capital stock. For manufacturing sectors, these variables are deated using
price deators at the 4 digit NACE level from the European Statistical O¢ ce18 .
For the services sectors we use a NACE 2 digit price deator from the EU Klems
database. In addition to the forementioned variables, Belgian rms are obliged
to report information about formal training19 they provide to their employees.
In particular, they have to report the number of employees that followed some
kind of formal training as well as the hours spent on this training and the training
costs. This allows us to obtain a rm-level measure of training for more than
170; 000 Belgian rms active in manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics of the dataset used. A Belgian rm
active in the private sector employs on average 16:9 employees and generates a
turnover of around 10 million euro. It pays an average wage of around 35; 000
euro and the average labor productivity (= value added per employee) equals
63; 900 euro. The second and third column compare these gures between rms
that provided training to at least one employee in at least one year of the sample
period with rms that have never trained an employee over the sample period.
By comparing columns (2) and (3) it can be seen that less than 10% of the rms
have ever invested in training of one of their employees. These rms are typically
larger in terms of both employment and turnover. Moreover they pay higher
wages and have a higher labor productivity. Surpirsingly, rms that provide
training to their employees have a lower capital/labor ratio than non-training
rms, but this result changes when we control for other characteristics as we
will see below. In rms that train their workers in a given period, more than
17These are all Belgian enterprises with the exclusion of one-man businesses.
18For some 4 digit NACE sectors, price deators are not reported. Here we use the 3 digit
deator.
19Formal training excludes training that takes place at the workoor or self study. The
training has to take place at a seperate training room or workoor especially developed for
training activities. Training can take place inside or outside the rm.
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50% of the employees benet from this training and spent on average almost 40
hours on this training. The average cost of training an employee equals more
than 1; 500 euro.
Table 2 shows the results of the regression of di¤erent key variables on a
training dummy. This dummy equals 1 when a particular rm provides training
to at least one of its employees in a given period and 0 otherwise. The dependent
variable is expressed in logarithms, such that the coe¢ cient on the training
dummy can be interpreted as a percentage di¤erence20 . The rst column of
Table 2 shows the results of this exercise. A training rm is more than twice as
large as a non-training rm and pays gross wages that are 36% higher. Labor
productivity is also higher but the di¤erence is smaller than for labor costs. In
column (2), we control for the size of the rm, that is we include the number of
employees as explanatory variable and in column (3), we also include NACE 4
digit dummies to control for sector characteristics. Now, labor productivity in
training rms is 27% higher than in non-training rms while labor costs are only
18% higher. Note that when controlling for industry characteristics and the size
of the rm, training rms have a higher capital-labor ratio than non-training
rms.
There exists considerable variation in the amount of training across sectors.
This is illustrated in Table 3 where the percentage of rms that provided training
to their employees in 2006 is shown. We also show the percentage of workers that
received some kind of (formal) training and the share of training costs in total
labor costs. These two measures are weighted averages, that is the total share of
trained workers in sector j equals
P
i LT;ijP
i Lij
, where i is a rm indicator. Likewise,
the share of training costs in total labor costs is the fraction of total training costs
in sector j divided by total labor costs in the sector. Despite that only slightly
more than 5% of the rms provided training to at least one employee in 2006,
more than 30% of all employees received training. This is because training rms
are much larger than non-training rms as can be seen in Table 1. Training costs
make up almost 1% of total labor costs. In general manufacturing rms train
more than their non-manufacturing counterparts. The most training intensive
sectors include Manufacturing of Chemical Products, Telecommunications and
Electricity Sector. Least training can be found in sectors such as Agriculture,
Construction and Hotels & Restaurants.
20Of course this is an approximation, certainly because for some variables, the di¤erence
between training and non-training rms is quite large.
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5 Results
5.1 General Results
Table 4 shows the results of estimating Equation (6) for all rms active in all sec-
tors pooled together and for manufacturing rms and services seperately21 . The
rst column for each subsample (Total, Manufacturing and Services) reports
the estimation results for the full sample by applying ordinary least squares
(OLS1)22 . Unfortunately, many rms do not report material costs23 such that
the estimation methodology described in Section 3 can only be applied to a
subset of of rms. To allow comparison between the ordinary least squares es-
timates and the estimates controlling for the endogeneity of inputs in the third
column(ACF), we report in the second column results for least squares esti-
mation (OLS2) on this subset of rms24 . The estimates reported in column
(1) show that training has a strongly signicant and economically important
e¤ect on productivity. These coe¢ cients imply that raising the share of trained
workers by 10% points, will increase value added by 4.6%. In column (2), OLS
estimates for the subset of rms that report material costs are displayed. The
coe¢ cient on training drops somewhat to :300 but remains highly signicant,
both statistically as economically. A possible explanation for the coe¢ cient to
drop is that small rms are excluded from the sample. It is generally accepted
that larger rms are more productive and as seen in Table 1, larger rms are
more likely to train their employees. This positive correlation can bias upward
the training coe¢ cient in column (1). Controlling for the endogeneity of in-
puts (and training) causes the training coe¢ cient to drop to :24 as shown in
column (3). The estimates imply that value added increases by 2.4% in re-
sponse to an increase of 10% points of the share of trained workers such that
even after controlling for the possible endogeneity of training, there remains a
substantially large impact of training on productivity. Note that the results
mean that on average the marginal product of a trained worker is around 32%
21Manufacturing rms are rms active in NACE sectors 15 to 36. The other sectors are
pooled together as "services" sectors.
22All regressions include year and industry dummies. Industry dummies are at the NACE
2 digit level for estimations on the whole sample and at the NACE 4 digit level for regressions
at the sector level.
23Only large rms in Belgium have to submit a full version of the annual report. Smaller
rms only have to submit a shorter version which does not include material costs. Firms are
dened to be large if they have on average more than 50 employees, realize a turnover of more
than 7.3 million euro or report a total value of assets of more than 3.65 million euro.
24All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and within group correlation.
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(= :243=:764) higher than the marginal product of an untrained worker. The
results for Manufacturing industries and Services seperately are comparable to
each other, although we nd a slightly stronger impact of training in services
sectors.
In Table 5 results for the estimation of the wage equation (13) are reported.
Again the exercise is done for the whole sample, the manufacturing sector and
the services sector. For each di¤erent sample, three di¤erent specications are
estimated. First, log wage is regressed on the share of trained workers together
with year and sector dummies (OLS1). Second, this exercise is repeated, but
the sample is now restricted to rms included in the productivity estimation
sample where we control for the endogeneity of inputs. As a result, the coef-
cient on training drops from .438 to .200 and a similar reasoning as with the
productivity analysis can be applied. In the third specication, we add controls
in the wage equation. In particular, we add the capital-labor ratio and total
factor productivity as control variables. For total factor productivity, we use
our estimate for !it from the productivity equation and includes among others
the ability of the labor force. By including total factor productivity in the wage
equation we control for these factors that could be correlated with the amount
of training in each rm. We nd that in the total Belgian private sector, wages
of trained employees are 16:7% higher than wages of untrained employees25 .
Results in Table 4 and Table 5, show that the impact of training on wages
is smaller than the impact on productivity26 . The productivity premium for a
trained worker is almost twice as high as his wage premium. We can statisti-
cally test the equality of T and T . Performing a Wald Test of this non-linear
25Note that the training variable measures the training ow, namely the number of workers
trained in a given year. If the subsample of workers receives training is the same every period,
this will lead the amount of training per trrained worker to be underestimated. If the workers
that receive training are di¤erent every year, this will lead our estimate for the number of
trained workers to be underestimated. We used the perpetual inventory method to construct
a measure for the stock of trained workers and experimented with di¤erent depreciation rates,
both dependent and independent of the number of workers that leave the rm. Our main
results are robust to the use of the stock or ow of trained workers.
26We compare the rst column of the wage equation with the rst column of the production
function, since in both specications, we do not control for the possible endogeneity of training.
Both coe¢ cients will likely to be upward biased (for example more able workers are more likely
to receive training and more able workers generate higher output and receive higher wages).
The same reasoning explains why we compare the second and third specication of the wage
equation with the second and third specication of the production function respectively. In the
third specication, we control for the endogeneity of training in both the production function
as in the wage equation.
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hypothesis (delta method) 27 results in a Chi-square value of 128:2 which means
that the null of equal coe¢ cients can be rejected at any conventional signi-
cance level. The same is true for the manufacturing sector and services sector
seperately with Chi-square values of 14:1 and 113:0 respectively. The fact that
we nd the impact of training on productivity to be higher than the impact
on wages, gives support to the Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) model that ex-
plains why rms invest in the general training of their employees. A necessary
condition is that productivity of employees increases more than their wages in
response to training28 . An important consequence is that in contrast to Becker
(1964), it is possible that there is underinvestment in training.
5.2 Results Sector Heterogeneity
So far, the assumption of equal production technologies in all Belgian sectors
has been maintained. Clearly this assumption is too strong, especially when
pooling manufacturing and services sectors together. In Tables 6 and 7 we es-
timate the impact of training on productivity for each NACE 2 digit sector
seperately. The unweighted average for the training coe¢ icient over all manu-
facturing sectors equals :231 when we estimate Equation (6) by ordinary least
squares. Controlling for the possible endogeneity of training, we nd that the
average training coe¢ cient drops to :177. The labor coe¢ cient decreases from
:763 to :741 which indicates that our estimation procedure does a good deal in
controlling for a likely upward bias on the labor and training coe¢ cients. The
results imply the marginal product of a trained worker is about 23% higher than
that of an untrained worker. Focusing on the manufacturing industries, we nd
that for 14 out of 17 sectors, the training coe¢ cient goes down compared to
the least squares estimates. Largest productivity gains from training can be
found in the Chemicals sector and Rubber and Plastic Sector29 . Also the labor
coe¢ cient goes down in most sectors. Note that the sectors for which the labor
coe¢ cient increases, are sectors for which this coe¢ cient is estimated relatively
27Again, to receive an estimate for T , we divide the coe¢ cient on the share of trained
workers reported in Table 4, by the labor coe¢ cient. Consequently, the null is: (tr=l) T =
0, where tr = T l. This hypothesis can be tested by applying the Delta method.
28Note that Becker (1964) also allows for the possibility that rms pays (part of) the
training costs. For this to be the case, the training needs to be rm specic in nature. We
will turn back to this issue in the next subsection.
29There are alse large gains in the sector of Wood Products, but here the training and
labor coe¢ cient are estimated imprecise.
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imprecise30 . The results for the services sectors are less satisfactory, which is
not surprising given the problems with estimating production functions for ser-
vices sectors. However, we do nd positive and signicant e¤ects of training on
worker productivity and for the majority of sectors, the training coe¢ cient goes
down when controlling for the possible endogeneity of inputs. The unweighted
average of the training coe¢ cient over all services sectors drops from 0:23 to 0:19
when moving from OLS to the adjusted Ackerberg et al. (2006) methodology.
Again we nd that productivity gains from training are slightly larger in the
services sectors compared to manufacturing sectors.
In Tables 8 and 9, we report results from estimating the wage equation for
each NACE 2 digit sector seperately. In both tables, we only report the co-
e¢ cient on the share of trained workers for expositional reasons. Again, the
forementioned three specications are reported. The number of observations
refers to those used in the rst specication, the number of observations used
in the second and third specication are the same as in the productivity tables.
Similar to the resuls of all sectors pooled together, the training coe¢ cient drops
when moving from the full sample to the restricted sample (with only rms that
report material costs). Also inserting control variables in the wage equation low-
ers the training coe¢ cient. The unweighted average of the training coe¢ cient in
this specication equals 0:122, which means that on average a trained employee
earns 12% more than its untrained counterpart. For the manufacturing and
services sectors seperate, this average equals :142 and :100 respectively.
Comparing the impact of job related training with the impact of general
education on wages, one nds these similar in magnitude. In his survey, Card
(1999) reports estimates for the impact of one year of education on wages be-
tween 5 and 15% while we estimate the wage premium for trained employees
to be 12%. However, note that the average training duration is only around 2
weeks, implying much larger returns to a week of training compared to a week
of schooling. A possible explanation could be that work related training is much
more designed to increase productivity directly than general education. While
large parts of the general education system are devoted to increasing general
knowledge not directly applicable in a professional carreer, one would not ex-
pect this to be the case for rm induced training. Note that our estimates for
30For example the standard error for the sectors Wearing Apparel, Wood Products and
Rubber and Plastic are considerably higher than those of other sectors.
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the impact of training on productivity and wages are considerably smaller that
those obtained by Dearden et al. (2006) for UK manufacturing rms31 . They
observe training at the sectoral level instead of at the rm level and so their
measure includes possible spillovers of training from workers who switch from
one employer to another32 .
Figure 1 combines the estimates of the impact on training and productivity.
The 45 line is plotted, such that all observations above this line represent
sectors for which the impact of training on productivity is larger than the impact
of training on wages33 . Most of the sectors are located above this line which is
consistent with Acemoglu and Pischke34 (1999a). The correlation between the
two measures equals .64 and is highly signicant.
5.3 Training as a continuous variable
In Table 10 we redene the training variable as average training costs per em-
ployee and estimate Equations (10) and (15) to determine the impact of training
intensity on productivity and wages respectively. Again results are reported for
the whole sample and manufacturing and services seperate. we control for the
possible endogeneity of training and add controls in the wage equation. The
coe¢ cient on average training intensity in the production function equals :107
implying that T equals :139 which is considerably higher than our estimate
for the impact of training intensity on wages (:090). These gures imply that
increasing the average training costs per employee with e100, raises output by
1%. The di¤erence between the wage and productivity premium is again highly
signicant. Also for the manufacturing and services sectors seperately, the pro-
ductivity premium is higher than the wage premium, although the di¤erence is
not statistically signicant for the manufacturing industries. A summary of the
results for sector specic estimates are reported in the last columns and Figure
31They nd that raising the fraction of trained workers with 10%, increases value added
by 6% and wages by 3%.
32However, this can only explain part of the di¤erence since their estimate is almost three
times as large as ours.
33We left out sectors 1-Agriculture, 64-Post and Telecommunications and 65-Financial
Intermediation which reported all three a very large impact on productivity and a low or
even zero impact on wages. Moreover, the number of observations used in the estimation was
limited for these sectors.
34This nding on itself is also consistent with rm specic training and perfect competition
in the labor market. An issue we will turn back to in the next section.
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2 where the 45 line is added35 . It can be seen that for the majority of sectors,
investing in training has a larger impact on marginal productivity of a worker
than on its wage. The correlation between the impact on productivity and on
wages equals :76 and is highly signicant.
5.4 Other Types of Specication
We performed a number of robustness checks to show that results are not driven
by one particular specication. First, we dropped the linear approximation of
the training term in Equations 2 and 13. In the estimation strategy for the
production function, we adjust the computation of the productivity estimatesb!it = bit   llit   l ln(1 + T;it LT;itLit )   kkit and instead of applying linear
techniques to estimate the wage equation we use non-linear least squares. A
summary of the results is reported in Table 11. Results are qualitatively and
quantitively similar to the linear approximation36 , although the magnitude of
the training e¤ect is estimated to be slightly higher. Again, the productivity
premium exceeds the wage premium. Furthermore, we estimate Equations (2)
and (13) with Zellners seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimator, which
allows the error terms of both equations to be correlated. Again the main results
hold. in that the productivity premium is higher than the wage premium for
trained employees37 . The di¤erence is also statistically signicant. Third, we
add the average salary in a rm as control variable in the production function
instead of applying the Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) estimation strat-
egy. The average rm-level wage should pick up unobserved labor quality and
productivity di¤erences if workers are paid their marginal product. Also this
strategy leaves our main conclusions una¤ected.
5.5 Worker heterogeneity
In this subsection, we include other forms of worker heterogeneity in the em-
pirical framework. First we infer whether there exist di¤erences in the impact
of training between male and female workers. Second, we include measures to
35Sectors 14-Other Mining and Quarrying, 21-Pulp and Paper Products, 37-Recycling and
64-Post and Telecommunications are left out.
36Note that the reported coe¢ cients are direct estimates for T and should be compared
with tr=l in Table 4.
37Here we do not control for the possible endogeneity of training in the production function.
For the wage equation, we exclude the control variables. One can argue that the bias of
the estimated training coe¢ cient is more or less the same in both the wage equation and
production function .
21
make a distinction between low and high skilled workers. The empirical frame-
work to estimate the productivity and wage premia when the workforce can be
divided among several dimensions is outlined in Appendix A.
Gender Di¤erences in Training
In Table 12 we report results for the estimation of Equations (A.4) and (A.10)
where we divide the labor force into trained males, untrained males, trained
females and untrained females to infer whether there is a di¤erential impact
of training on wages and productivity of males and females. For brevity, we
only report results for the specication where we control for the endogeneity of
training in both the production function and wage equation. For the production
function, we report direct estimates for T ; F and FT that measure produc-
tivity premia for the di¤erent worker characteristics. The impact of training on
productivity T equals :328 and is comparable in magnitude with estimates from
previous specications. Again, the productivity di¤erential between trained and
untrained workers is higher in the services sector than in the manufacturing sec-
tor. The wage premium for trained workers is 14:7% and is again estimated to
be smaller than the productivity premium. We nd that productivity of female
workers is not signicantly di¤erent from productivity of male workers. How-
ever, earnings of female workers are around 16% lower in the Belgian private
sector which is consistent with previous studies that have shown female workers
earn lower wages than their male counterparts (e.g. Hellerstein and Neumark,
1999). Surprisingly, while there exists no di¤erence in productivity premium of
training between male and female workers (FT ), the di¤erence in wages be-
tween males and females seems to disappear for employees that reveived work
related training. The interaction between female and training FT is positive
and signicant, which means that wages of female workers increase more in re-
spons to training than wages of male workers. This result can be compared with
Booth (1991) who nds that in the UK wages of male employees increase by
10% while female earnings rise with 16% in response to training.
Other Types of Worker Heterogeneity
There could be concerns that our methodology does not fully control for worker
heterogeneity. To address these concerns, we include two typers of worker het-
erogeneity in our production function and wage equation estimates. First, we
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make a distinction between blue collar workers, white collar workers and man-
agers. Second, we construct a measure for the education level of the worker and
nally we include rm xed e¤ects.
Besides the number of trained employees at each rm, we also observe the
number of blue collar workers, the number of white collar workers and the num-
ber of managers active in a rm. Inserting these types of worker heterogeneity38
and applying again the Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) methodology leads
to conclusions comparable to those in our base specication. Results for sec-
tors pooled together are reported in Table 13. The coe¢ cient on training drops
slightly to :18 in the production function and to :09 in the wage equation. The
median of the training coe¢ cient in the production function is :14 and :11 in
the wage equation when estimating the model for each NACE 2 digit sector
seperately.
Moreover, we construct a measure for the average education level of the
workers. Although we do not posess detailed information about the skill com-
position of workers, we observe the education level of every employee that leaves
or enters the rm in a given year39 . We only observe this information for a lim-
ited sample of large rms40 . Using this data, we compute the educational level
of the inow and outow of employees and we take the average over all years to
retrieve a proxy for the educational composition of each rms workforce. We
include the share of high-educated employees in both the production function
and wage equation and estimate both equations controlling for the possible en-
dogeneity of inputs (cf. Equations (A.8) and (A.14) . As can be seen from the
last two rows of Table 13, the training coe¢ cient drops somewhat compared to
the base specication. However, the impact of training on productivity remains
larger than the impact on wages. The results also indicate41 that a schooled
worker is almost two times as productive as an unschooled worker and earns a
substantially higher wage but this wage premium is lower than the productivity
38For the whole sample, around 52% of the workforce is blue-collar, 44% white collar and
1.4% management. In the manufacturing sector the shares are respectively 66%, 31% and
1.6% and in the services sectors respectively 45%, 51% and 1.3%. The percentages do not
sum up to 100% because some of the workers have an undened contract and can not be
classied.
39More precise we observe whether the highest education of an entrant or departure is
primary, secundary, higher or university. We dene an employee to be high-educated if he
received higher or university education and low-educated if he received at most primary or
secundary education.
40These are rms that have at least 50 employees, realize a turnover of more than e7:3
million or have a total book value of their assets that exceeds e3:65 million.
41These gures are not reported in the table for expositional reasons.
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premium, namely 70%.
Finally we repeated the exercise with rm xed e¤ects. These should pick up
all unobserved worker heterogeneity that is constant over time. Unfortunately,
using xed e¤ects to estimate production functions does not perform very well.
When there is measurement error in the input variables, rst or mean di¤erenc-
ing can exacerbate the bias in the input coe¢ cients estimates. This is especially
true for highly persistent input variables (Griliches and Hausman 1986) such as
capital and training. Results are reported in Appendix B. Table B.1 shows that
for the production function, as expected, unreasonably low estimates of returns
to scale are obtained due to a large decrease in both the capital and labor co-
e¢ cient. Also the training coe¢ cient drops substantially. However, comparing
the impact of training on productivity and wages, we still nd the productivity
premium for trained employees to be substantially higher than the wage pre-
mium42 and the di¤erence is statistically signicant. Estimating training impact
by sector shows that again for the majority of sectors the productivity premium
of trained workers is higher than the wage premium of trained workers as shown
if Figure B.1. The average productivity premium across all sectors equals :10
while the average wage premium is not higher than :026. Again, we suspect
these coe¢ cients to be severely downward biased in contrast to the coe¢ cients
obtained by applying the Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) methodology.
5.6 Firm specic versus general training
Note that the gap between the productivity and wage premium for trained
employees can be explained equally well by perfect competition and rm specic
training as by imperfect competion and general training. Which of the two
theories is the best explanation for our results? Recall that under rm specic
training the acquired skills are not applicable in other rms and the rm could
pay for all training costs. The rm recoups all the benets after training through
the higher marginal product of trained workers and equal wages of trained and
untrained workers. Becker (1964) noted that it could be optimal for both workers
and rms to share benets of training, namely under the form of higher wages
but still lower than the marginal product. Consequently, rms are less likely to
re trained workers. Moreover, trained workers are less likely to quit the rm
42Although we suspect these estimates to be downward biased, the bias in the production
function should be as large as the bias in the wage equation and thus it still makes sense to
compare both estimates.
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since skills are rm specic and they will earn lower wages at other employers.
In general one would expect both dismissal and quit rates to be lower in rms
that provide a substantial amount of training.
Under imperfect competition in the labor market and general training, a
negative correlation between the dismissal rate and training would arise since
the di¤erence between wage and marginal product is higher for trained workers.
However, when for example the presence of unions is the main source of wage
compression, it is possible that training has no impact on quit rates of workers
since trained workers could earn the same wage at other rms. To summarize, we
would expect a negative impact of training on the dismissal rate with perfect
competition and specic training as well as with imperfect competition and
general training. However, with perfect competition and specic training worker
quit rates should be inuenced by training while this is not necessarily the case
with general training and imperfect competition.
Our dataset allows us not only to compute general seperation rates, but also
to distinguish between whether these seperations are dismissals initiated by the
rm or quits initiated by the worker43 . When we regress the quit and dismissal
rates on the share of trained workers lagged one and two periods, we nd that
dismissal rates are negatively and signicantly a¤ected by the lagged share of
trained employees44 as can be seen from Table C.1 . Quit rates however seem to
be una¤ected by the number of trained workers. The coe¢ cient on the lagged
share of trained employees is not signicantly di¤erent from zero45 . The share of
trained employees lagged two periods has even a positive and signicant impact
on the quit rates46 . Although not a formal proof, these results suggest that the
training is most likely to be general in nature instead of rm specic. Moreover,
recall that we observe formal training, which is more likely to be general in
nature.
6 Conclusions
This paper empirically investigates the impact of rm provided training on both
wages and productivity. To this end we make use of a rm level data set of more
43We only observe these variables for the subset of large rms.
44We control not only for rm xed e¤ects but include also inows of employees both
contemporaneous and lagged one period and year dummies to control for business cycles.
45The p-value is equal to .333.
46When aggregating training and seperation rates at the 4 digit level, there was a substan-
tial and signicant correlation between the dismissal rate and share of trained employees but
not between the quit rate and share of trained employees.
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than 170,00 rms active in Belgium. We are able to measure for each rm the
amount of employees that received some kind of formal training as well as the
training costs and the hours spent on training for the period 1997 to 2006.
After controlling for the possible endogeneity of training we nd that training
boosts marginal productivity of an employee more than it increases its wage.
More precise, our results indicate that the productivity premium for a trained
employee is on average around 23% while the wage premium is only 12%. We
nd a slightly higher impact of training in services compared to manufacturing
sectors. Our results are robust accross di¤erent specications and denitions of
the training variable. Also controlling for di¤erent kinds of worker heterogeneity
leaves our main ndings una¤acted. There exists considerable heterogeneity in
the impact of training on both productivity and wages. Sectors with the largest
e¤ects of training include the Chemical sector and Rubber and Plastic sector.
The results are consistent with recent theories such as Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999a) that explain rm provided general training by imperfect competition in
the labor market and wage compression. This nding can have important pol-
icy implications. The standard result of Becker (1964) is that if workers are
not credit constrained, training investments are e¢ cient and as such, govern-
ment intervention is unnecessary or should be directed to the credit markets.
However, with imperfect labor markets and a compressed wage structure, there
could be underinvestment in training from a social point of view. For example,
when making their training decisions, rms do not take into account the possi-
ble externalities for future employers of trained workers (Acemoglu and Pischke
1999b). This opens possibilities for the government to implement training sub-
sidies.
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8 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Total Training No Training
Employment 16.9 84.8 6.67
Turnover (1000e) 10,078 37,245 2,820
Labor Cost per Worker (1000e) 35.1 44.8 33.7
Labor Productivity (1000e) 63.9 73.0 62.5
Capital/Labor (1000e) 75.5 69.8 76.3
Observations 919,077 54,867 864,210
Nr. Firms 171,210 15,499 155,711
Proportion of Trained Workers 0.53
Cost of Training per Worker Trained 1,581
Hours Training per Worker Trained 39.8
Table 2: Summary Regressions
Dependent Var. (1) (2) (3) # Obs
Employment (ln) 2.27* 1.97* 919,077
Turnover (ln) 2.56* 0.31* 0.26* 380,091
Lab. Costs (ln) 0.36* 0.27* 0.18* 919,077
Lab. Prod. (ln) 0.24* 0.40* 0.27* 910,615
Capital/Labor (ln) -0.27* 0.35* 0.27* 891,984
* Denotes siginicant at 1 perc. level.
(1) Regression of dependent variable on training dummy,
(2) Similar to (1) but controlling for size (employment),
(3) Similar to (2) but with NACE 4 digit dummies.
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Table 4: Impact of Training on Productivity
Total Manufacturing Services
OLS1 OLS2 ACF OLS1 OLS2 ACF OLS1 OLS2 ACF
Labor .785 .747 .764 .802 .767 .791 .780 .735 .751
(.001) (.004) (.008) (.003) (.007) (.015) (.001) (.005) (.009)
Capital .165 .123 .088 .178 .151 .129 .163 .115 .081
(.001) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.005) (.008) (.001) (.003) (.004)
Training .460 .315 .243 .403 .300 .215 .461 .301 .257
(.008) (.010) (.010) (.015) (.016) (.017) (.008) (.012) (.014)
Obs 804,293 73,930 73,930 123,834 23,345 23,345 677,764 50,585 50,585
Clust 135,865 13,757 13,757 18,422 3,878 3,878 117,021 9,879 9,879
Standard errors are computed using a block bootstrap procedure with 500 replications and are robust against
heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation
Table 5: Impact of Training on Wages
Total Manufacturing Services
OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS1 OLS2 OLS3
Training .438* .200* .167 .432* .219* .187* .440* .190* .165*
(.006) (.006) (.007) (.009) (.009) (.011) (.007) (.009) (.009)
ln(K/L) -.015* .017* -.022*
(.002) (.004) (.002)
TFP .337* .306* .343*
(.006) (.008) (.007)
Obs. 828,303 73,816 73,816 126581 23,318 23,318 701,722 50,498 50,498
Nr. Clusters 139,133 13,746 13,746 18759 3,878 3,878 120,374 9,868 9,868
R Squared .134 .184 .321 .154 .221 .336 .132 .167 .309
Chi2 T = T 333.6 128.2 89.4 14.1 231.6 113.0
Standard errors are computed using a block bootstrap procedure with 500 replications and are robust against
heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation
* denotes signicance at 1% level
32
Table 6: Results Productivity Manufacturing Sectors
Labor Capital Training Nr. Obs
OLS ACF OLS ACF OLS ACF Obs Clust
15 Food Products .789 .729 .175 .174 .165 .130 3,571 600
(.018) (.035) (.016) (.036) (.031) (.034)
17 Textile Products .753 .720 .154 .133 .319 .227 1,729 298
(.027) (.094) (.018) (.038) (.042) (.047)
18 Wearing Apparel .665 .675 .227 .160 .101 .049 364 66
(.112) (.240) (.040) (.094) (.193) (.124)
20 Wood Products .668 .700 .142 .102 .659 .264 588 110
(.038) (.266) (.034) (.074) (.135) (.106)
21 Paper Products .853 .658 .120 .269 .149 .036 685 98
(.060) (.179) (.035) (.099) (.070) (.057)
22 Publishing .804 .828 .103 .077 .154 .157 1,764 319
(.027) (.071) (.017) (.023) (.064) (.049)
24 Chemical Products .841 .816 .125 .116 .405 .305 2,134 331
(.029) (.067) (.026) (.047) (.063) (.053)
25 Rubber and Plastic .788 .803 .183 .172 .341 .255 1,477 227
(.030) (.228) (.022) (.064) (.047) (.050)
26 Mineral Products .798 .773 .135 .157 .219 .174 1,917 311
(.023) (.065) (.020) (.047) (.048) (.043)
27 Basic Metals .802 .772 .171 .191 .105 .084 995 146
(.034) (.112) (.025) (.049) (.068) (.060)
28 Metal Products .760 .733 .139 .129 .176 .102 2,779 478
(.020) (.033) (.012) (.016) (.038) (.039)
29 Machinery .822 .789 .114 .134 .287 .197 1,681 283
(.034) (.076) (.021) (.029) (.051) (.051)
31 Electrical Machinery .800 .745 .143 .132 .236 .219 665 104
(.038) (.086) (.027) (.059) (.091) (.102)
32 Radio, TV and Telecom .905 .894 .068 .064 .204 .151 302 54
(.075) (.144) (.071) (.102) (.108) (.144)
33 Medical Eq., Optical Instr. .813 .791 .047 .012 .256 .182 346 64
(.074) (.147) (.054) (.080) (.101) (.131)
34 Motor Vehicles .843 .776 .108 .120 .050 .087 752 121
(.022) (.042) (.020) (.027) (.068) (.061)
36 Furniture, Manuf. n.e.c. .667 .551 .184 .167 .087 .137 1,101 181
(.039) (.086) (.025) (.055) (.057) (.063)
Standard errors are computed using a block bootstrap procedure with 500 replications and are robust
against heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation
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Table 7: Results Productivity Services Sectors
Labor Capital Training Obs.
OLS ACF OLS ACF OLS ACF Obs. Clust.
1 Agriculture .701 .648 .097 .132 .196 .339 459 96
(.058) (.077) (.035) (.074) (.164) (.134)
14 Mining .837 .798 .198 .267 .324 .017 345 60
(.059) (.250) (.056) (.305) (.120) (.143)
37 Recycling .737 .737 .164 .124 .239 .242 364 79
(.071) (.108) (.032) (.067) (.135) (.194)
45 Construction .774 .773 .136 .134 .184 .123 5,521 939
(.016) (.038) (.010) (.017) (.022) (.023)
50 Sales Motor Vehicles .804 .803 .091 .081 .295 .179 3,974 746
(.019) (.052) (.013) (.026) (.042) (.033)
51 Wholesale Trade .742 .758 .077 .061 .351 .317 21,380 4,017
(.008) (.013) (.005) (.006) (.021) (.022)
52 Retail Trade .779 .735 .158 .158 .125 .135 4,104 869
(.017) (.054) (.012) (.029) (.030) (.040)
55 Hotels and Restaurants .820 .798 .123 .124 .107 .084 877 164
(.030) (.058) (.022) (.047) (.043) (.047)
60 Land Transport .753 .726 .144 .147 .116 .079 2,617 455
(.021) (.070) (.015) (.043) (.060) (.043)
63 Transport Activities .633 .681 .174 .133 .305 .222 1,892 411
(.023) (.029) (.015) (.022) (.052) (.051)
64 Post and Telecommunications .753 .749 .202 .175 .283 .284 337 86
(.049) (.120) (.031) (.058) (.175) (.161)
65 Financial Intermediation .778 .766 .180 .214 .560 .453 315 79
(.072) (.189) (.048) (.123) (.264) (.209)
70 Real Estate .551 .523 .154 .090 .352 .252 1,360 275
(.028) (.048) (.020) (.040) (.091) (.114)
71 Renting of Machinery .507 .575 .367 .300 .104 .149 487 96
(.050) (.127) (.051) (.060) (.125) (.090)
72 Computer and Related Activities .855 .849 .084 .088 -.030 .002 1,587 393
(.020) (.026) (.010) (.014) (.039) (.046)
74 Other Business Activities .777 .774 .109 .093 .196 .201 4,313 975
(.014) (.028) (.009) (.015) (.031) (.038)
Standard errors are computed using a block bootstrap procedure with 500 replications and are robust
against heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation
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Table 8: Results Wages Manufacturing Sectors
Training Nr. Obs.
OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 Obs. Clust
15 Food Products .353 .155 .121 21,447 3,259
(.021) (.019) (.023)
17 Textile Products .296 .171 .118 7,311 1,068
(.030) (.031) (.040)
18 Wearing Apparel .702 .123 .044 3,446 535
(.190) (.224) (.189)
20 Wood Products .290 .185 .112 5,466 787
(.073) (.048) (.054)
21 Paper Products .372 .179 .142 2,274 300
(.044) (.036) (.041)
22 Publishing .364 .074 .078 14,398 2,322
(.030) (.026) (.029)
24 Chemical Products .455 .312 .242 4,774 671
(.103) (.032) (.043)
25 Rubber and Plastic .413 .239 .212 5,027 673
(.031) (.025) (.042)
26 Mineral Products .306 .155 .143 7,680 1,062
(.028) (.025) (.028)
27 Basic Metals .331 .146 .112 2,627 344
(.053) (.048) (.048)
28 Metal Products .309 .195 .157 22,864 3,340
(.020) (.031) (.031)
29 Machinery .429 .237 .197 8,253 1,228
(.033) (.031) (.038)
31 Electrical Machinery .342 .218 .173 2,743 408
(.041) (.049) (.057)
32 Radio, TV and Telecom .405 .287 .248 799 128
(.078) (.059) (.080)
33 Medical Eq., Optical Instr. .359 .104 .073 3,079 475
(.058) (.045) (.054)
34 Motor Vehicles .264 .123 .107 2,536 367
(.046) (.045) (.047)
36 Furniture, Manuf. n.e.c. .305 .177 .143 9,591 1,442
(.058) (.050) (.056)
Standard errors are computed using a block bootstrap procedure with 500
replications and are robust against heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation.
The number of observations refers to the rst specication where all rms are
included. The number of observations used in the restricted sample of Columns
(2) and (3) are equal to those reported in Table 7
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Table 9: Results Wages Services Sectors
Training Nr. Obs
OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 Obs. Clust
1 Agriculture .428 .125 .145 14,077 2,424
(.058) (.090) (.074)
14 Mining .329 .091 .050 1,126 157
(.083) (.069) (.073)
37 Recycling .305 .267 .254 1,668 274
(.074) (.096) (.095)
45 Construction .335 .150 .134 133,695 21,316
(.014) (.018) (.019)
50 Sales Motor Vehicles .375 .185 .137 48,134 7,519
(.021) (.024) (.027)
51 Wholesale Trade .468 .191 .181 120,834 19,621
(.014) (.013) (.014)
52 Retail Trade .254 .078 .060 110,918 19,138
(.020) (.020) (.025)
55 Hotels and Restaurants .326 .122 .104 54,774 10,545
(.032) (.031) (.034)
60 Land Transport .195 .094 .061 35,808 5,451
(.022) (.029) (.028)
63 Transport Activities .175 .121 .100 14,923 2,450
(.026) (.032) (.034)
64 Post and Telecommunications .409 -.014 -.082 2,869 650
(.067) (.105) (.106)
65 Financial Intermediation .401 .025 -.021 10,220 1,928
(.052) (.107) (.115)
70 Real Estate .542 .303 .265 20,425 4,013
(.042) (.064) (.072)
71 Renting of Machinery .547 .129 .084 4,971 905
(.040) (.059) (.051)
72 Computer and Related Activities .316 -.024 -.005 15,837 3,281
(.021) (.031) (.037)
74 Other Business Activities .409 .143 .137 90,400 17,081
(.012) (.021) (.024)
Standard errors are computed using a block bootstrap procedure with 500
replications and are robust against heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation.
The number of observations refers to the rst specication where all rms are
included. The number of observations used in the restricted sample of Columns
(2) and (3) are equal to those reported in Table 7
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Table 10: Training as Average Training Costs per Trained Worker
Total Manufacturing Services Each Sector Seperat.
Prod. Wage Prod. Wage Prod. Wage.
Capital .092 .130 .085 T
(.004) (.024) (.004) Min .012
Labor .771 .799 .759 Max .201
(.007) (.082) (.009) Av. .103
Training .107 .090 .094 .097 .113 .090
(.006) (.004) (.010) (.007) (.008) (.005) T
TFP .339 .306 .347 Min .024
(.006) (.036) (.007) Max .145
Cap/Lab -.014 .017 -.021 Av. .083
(.002) (.004) (.002)
Test for T = T
Chi2 51.2 1.62 46.3
p  value .00 .20 .00
Standard errors are computed using a block bootstrap procedure with 500 replications and
are robust against heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation
Table 11: Results Further Robustness Checks
Total Manufacturing Services
Prod. Wage Prod. Wage Prod. Wage
Non-Linear Specication .374 .233 .313 .259 .407 .239
SUR Model .295 .208 .310 .225 .273 .199
(.006) (.005) (.009) (.007) (.008) (.006)
Wage as Control .189 .168 .201 .178 .171 .160
(.010) (.006) (.018) (.009) (.013) (.008)
Standard errors are computed using a block bootstrap procedure with 500
replications and are robust against heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation
Table 12: Disitinction between Male and Female Trained Workers
Total Manufacturing Services
Prod. Wage Prod. Wage Prod. Wage.
k .103 .131 .097
(.059) (.010)
l .736 .764 .723
(.222) (.019)
T or T .328 .147 .245 .158 .369 .146
(.023) (.012) (.081) (.035) (.031) (.015)
F or F .016 -.163 -.074 -.230 .044 -.138
(.042) (.016) (.568) (.037) (.049) (.019)
FT or FT .133 .201 .306 .258 .081 .194
(.063) (.033) (8.08) (.059) (.068) (.043)
Productivity estimates refer to estimation of Equation (A.4) and are
controlled for simultaneity bias (ACF procedure).Wage results refer
to estimation of Equation (A.10) by nonlinear least squares with
added control variables.
Standard errors are computed using a block bootstrap procedure
with 500 replications and are robust against heteroskedasticity
and intra-group correlation
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Table 13: Worker Heterogeneity
Total Manufacturing Services
Prod. Wage Prod. Wage Prod. Wage.
Type of Contract (lT or T ) .176 .141 .173 .174 .180 .122
(.010) (.006) (.015) (.008) (.013) (.008)
Schooling (lT or T ) .152 .090 .155 .128 .149 .076
(.010) (.009) (.015) (.010) (.013) (.008)
Productivity estimates refer to estimation of Equations (A.7) and (A.8) and are
controlled for simultaneity bias (ACF procedure).Wage results refer to estimation
of Equations (A.13) and (A.14) by ordinary least squares with added control variables.
Standard errors are computed using a block bootstrap procedure 500 replications
and are robust against heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation
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Figure 1: Impact Training on Productivity and Wages
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Figure 2: Impact Training on Productivity and Wages, Training as Continuous
Variable
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Appendix
A Other sources of worker heterogeneity
A.1 Productivity
The derivations in the main text assumed that training is the only source of
heterogeneity in the labor force. This appendix shows how we can generalize
the expression for the labor aggregate when workers can be di¤erentiated by
multiple characteristics. Next to training we also observe the gender of the
labor force, whether the workers are blue collar, white collar or part of the
management sta¤ and their schooling level. When there are multiple observed
characteristics, the workforce can be described by all K possible combinations
of these characteristics and the labor aggregate bL can be written as:
bL = L0 + K 1X
k=1
(1 + k)Lk (A.1)
where again k is the productivity premium of a type k worker relative to
a worker of the base type (k =
MPk MP0
MP0
). When we include for example
training and the type of contract (blue collar, white collar or management) as
worker characteristics, there are six di¤erent types of workers namely untrained
blue collar, untrained white collar, untrained management, trained blue collar,
trained white collar and trained managament. If the base type is an untrained
blue collar worker, then for example the relative productivity premium of a
trained white collar worker, TW , is dened as k =
MPTW MPUB
MPUB
withMPTW
the marginal product of a trained white collar worker and MPUB the marginal
product of an untrained blue collar worker. Again, the labor aggregate can be
rewritten as: bL = L 1 + K 1X
k=1
k
Lk
L
!
(A.2)
and note that to estimate the productivity premium of each di¤erent type of
worker, we need to observe the proportion of each type in the total workforce.
While we lack data on training di¤erentiated by the employment contract of the
trained worker, we do observe the gender of each trained employee. We divide
the labor force into untrained male, untrained female, trained male and trained
female workers. Consequently, the above equation can be redened as
bL = L1 + F LFUL + T LMTL + (1 + F )(1 + T )(1 + FT )  1 LFTL

(A.3)
where LMU represents the number of male workers that did not receive training,
which is the base category. LFU ; LMT and LFT are the number of untrained
females, trained males and trained females respectively. The productivity pre-
mium for an untrained female worker F is given by F  MPFU MPMUMPMU and is
dened relative to the productivity of an untrained male worker. Likewise, T is
the productivity premium of a trained male worker The productivity premium
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of a trained female worker can be decomposed into the product of female and
training premia and an interaction between the two, namely FT . When this
interaction is larger than zero, training of females pays o¤ more than training
of male workers and the other way around when the interaction is negative.
A value of zero for this parameter means that marginal productivity increases
by the same amount for female workers as for male workers. Like before, the
expression for the labor aggregate can be plugged in in the production function
and renders estimates for the di¤erential impact of training on female compared
to male workers:
y = 0 + kk + ll + lFU
LFU
L
+ lMT
LMT
L
+ (A.4)
l
 
(1 + T )(1 + F )(1 + FT )  1
 LFT
L
+ 
Unfortunately we do not observe the other worker characteristics for trained
versus untrained workers which forces us to make some simplifying restrictions
to retrieve an expression for the labor aggregate that can be estimated. These
assumptions are similar to other studies that divide the labor force among sev-
eral dimensions to reduce the number of parameter to be estimated (e.g. Van
Biesebroeck, 2007). First, we have to assume that he relative di¤erences in
marginal productivity between two workers that di¤er by one characteristic are
the same irrespective of what their other characteristics are. This means that
the relative marginal product of trained workers compared to untrained work-
ers is the same for all di¤erent types of workers. Furthermore we restrict the
proportion of one type of workers to be constant across other groups dened by
the other characteristics. We apply these restrictions to two di¤erent divisions
of the labor force.
First we divide the workers among their type of job (blue collar, white collar
or management) and training status. As a result, the unrestricted version of the
labor aggregate would consist of six terms, one for each di¤erent type of worker.
Applying the restrictions, simplies the expression for the labor aggregate con-
siderably and is given by
bL = L(1 + Z LZL + W LWL )(1 + T LTL ) (A.5)
where LZ and LW represent management and white colar workers respectively.
Z and W represent the productivity premium of a manager and white collar
worker respectively relative to the productivity of a blue collar worker. These
relative productivity premiums are the same irrespective of the training status
of the worker.
Second, we divide the labor force among the schooling level and training status
of the workers. Schooling is constructed such that the variable takes on two
values, namely high-schooled and low-schooled. The restricted version of the
labor aggregate can be written as
bL = L(1 + S LSL )(1 + T LTL ) (A.6)
where LS is the number of high schooled workers and S represents the produc-
tivity premium of a high-schooled worker relative to a low-schooled worker. The
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production function equations that are taken to the data are then reespectively:
y = 0 + kk + ll + lT
LT
L
+ lW
LW
L
+ lZ
LZ
L
+  (A.7)
and
y = 0 + kk + ll + lT
LT
L
+ lS
LS
L
+  (A.8)
A.2 Wages
In a similar way, we can extend the empirical framework for estimating wage
premia by including multiple characteristics of the workforce. Similar to the
production function, we want to measure the di¤erential impact of training on
wages for male and female workers. Dividing the labor force into four types,
namely male untrained, male trained, female untrained and female trained, we
can write the average wage in a rm as
W =WMU

1 + T
LMT
L
+ F
LFU
L
+ [(1 + T )(1 + F )(1 + FT )  1] LFT
L

(A.9)
whith WFU the wage of an untrained female worker and WMU the wage of an
untrained male worker. The wage premium of a female worker F is dened
as F = WFU WMUWMU . Likewise the wage premium for a male trained worker
T is dened relative to the wage of an untrained male worker. The coe¢ cient
FT for the interaction between being female and trained is equal to zero if the
wage premium for a trained worker is the same for males and females. Taking
natural logarithms and adding control variables and an additive error term, the
equation that is estimated is:
w = wBU +F
LUF
L
+T
LT
L
+((1 + F )(1 + T )(1 + FT )  1) LTF
L
+X+"
(A.10)
We also include the schooling level and type of job (blue collar, white collar,
management) as extra characteristics. We impose similar restrictions as for esti-
mating the productivity premium, namely equal proportions and equal relative
wage premia assumptions. Dividing the labor force among their type of job and
training status and applying these restrections renders the following expression
for the average wage, W in a rm:
W =WBU (1 + Z
LZ
L
+ W
LW
L
)(1 + T
LT
L
) (A.11)
where WBU is the wage of an untrained blue collar worker and Z and W are
the relative wage premia of a manager and a white collar worker. Likewise,
when dividing the labor force among the schooling level and training status, the
expression for the average wage becomes:
W =WBU (1 + S
LS
L
)(1 + T
LT
L
) (A.12)
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where S represents the wage premium of a schooled worker. Taking natural
logarithms and adding control variables and an additive error term, one obtains
the equations that will be estimated:
w = wBU + W
LW
L
+ Z
LZ
L
+ T
LT
L
+X + " (A.13)
and
w = wLU + S
LS
L
+ T
LT
L
+X + " (A.14)
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B Fixed E¤ects
Table B.1: Fixed E¤ects Regression
Total Manufacturing Services Each Sector
Prod. Wage Prod. Wage Prod. Wage. Separately
Capital .064 .067 .063 T
(.002) (.003) (.002) Min -.037
Labor .668 .688 .661 Max .36
(.003) (.006) (.004) Avg. .096
Training .044 .025 .048 .031 .042 .023 T
(.005) (.003) (.008) (.004) (.006) (.004) Min.
Cap/Lab .027 .028 .026 Max. -.044
(.001) (.002) (.001) Max. .104
Avg. .026
Nr. Obs. 88,357 89,991 27,271 27,519 61,086 62,472
Test for T = T
Chi2 24.3 7.5 15.1
p  value .000 .006 .000
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Figure B.1: Impact Training on Productivity and Wages: Fixed E¤ects.
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C Training and Seperation Rates
Table C.1: Seperation rates and training
FE one lag FE 2 lags
Dismissals Quits Dismissals Quits
Train. Sharet-1 -.00254* -.00132 -.0028* -.0023
(.0015) (.0024) (.0015) (.00241)
Train. Sharet-2 .00174 .00627**
(.00149) (.00237)
Nr. Obs 76,359 76,359 76340 76340
Firm and year xed e¤ects included
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05
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